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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are as follows: 
Van Adams, Appellant and Defendant 
Action Collection Services, Inc., Respondent and Plaintiff (Assignee of Jus 4 Fun 
Rental, Inc.) 
Jus 4 Fun Rental, Inc., Assignor to Action Collection Services, Inc. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals impermissibly conflict with 
existing case law regarding admissions of the parties as supplementing the record on 
appeal? 
2. Does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case conflict with its 
decision in Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 898 P.2d 1230, 265 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995)? 
3. Does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case conflict with the 
decision of this Court in Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 801 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1990) and create a privilege where none exists? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
By this petition for a Writ of Certiorari, petitioner Van Adams seeks review of the 
opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, issued and filed on June 20, 1996. On or about 
July 1, 1996, petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration (petition for rehearing), which 
was summarily denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 19, 1996. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The final order of the Court of Appeals, the order denying petitioner's petition for 
rehearing, was entered on July 19, 1996. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
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consider this petition pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2-2(3), Utah Code Annotated and 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Petition is filed within the time 
required by Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Appendix 3 for full text of the following rules: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 504(c). Who may claim the privilege. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
On or about May 24, 1995, petitioner appealed from the final judgment of the 
Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael K. Burton, Judge. The underlying matter is a contract dispute between Jus 4 Fun 
Rental, Inc. and the defendant, Van Adams. 
Jus 4 Fun Rental rented two jet skis to the defendant and alleged that substantial 
damage was done to the skis during the time they were in defendant's possession and 
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under his control. After the parties were unsuccessful in attempting to resolve the dispute, 
Jus 4 Fun Rental assigned its cause of action to Action Collection Service, Inc., the 
plaintiff in the proceedings below. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The complaint in this case was filed on June 15, 1993. After defendant had filed 
his answer to the complaint, counsel for the plaintiff signed and filed a document entitled 
"Satisfaction of Judgment" with the court on December 2, 1993, which resulted in the 
case being dismissed.1 
A motion to vacate the dismissal was filed by counsel for the plaintiff on June 22, 
1994. Defendant resisted that motion and, alternatively, sought to compel more complete 
responses to defendant's discovery requests. 
A hearing was held on both the motion to vacate the dismissal and the motion to 
compel discovery responses. Without announcing the basis for its decision, the trial court 
granted the motion to vacate the dismissal. While sustaining some of defendant's requests 
for additional discovery, the trial court denied defendant the right to discover information 
1
 The Utah Court of Appeals declined to address the defendant's substantive procedural 
arguments because no order of dismissal was located in the record on appeal, even though 
defendant designated the entire record. It appears that the "order of dismissal" was an 
administrative order in response to the Satisfaction of Judgment filed by plaintiff and not an 
order signed by the trial court. 
Cm\DWSPleadings\Adams-Pet. for Cert 3 
constituting admissions by Jus 4 Fun Rental vital to its defenses and determined, without 
factual basis, that the plaintiff and Jus 4 Fun Rental were the same; therefore, counsel for 
the plaintiff was counsel for Jus 4 Fun Rental and defendant was not entitled to discover 
any communications between counsel for plaintiff and counsel for Jus 4 Fun Rental. 
After a trial on the merits, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against defendant on May 18, 1995. Notice of appeal was timely filed by the defendant 
on May 24, 1995. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. With respect 
to the defendant's procedural arguments, the Court of Appeals implicitly found that 
defendant had failed to meet his burden on appeal of seeing that the record contains the 
material necessary to support his appeal because the record on appeal did not contain a 
copy of an order of dismissal. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied by the 
Court of Appeals, which ignored defendant's argument that the admissions of plaintiff 
regarding the existence of the order of dismissal were sufficient to supplement the record. 
With respect to the other issues raised by defendant on appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals summarily rejected those arguments as being "without merit". The court gave 
no insight into its analysis of the issues presented. Perhaps the Court of Appeals felt it 
should not be burdened with such a small case. Dollar amounts do not alter principles of 
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law or justice, however, and the courts have a duty to review fully arguments made. The 
Court of Appeals disregarded its duty in favor of convenience concerning the appeal on 
the merits, including the absence of findings on an essential element of plaintiffs case -
that the damage to the jet skis exceeded "reasonable wear and tear." A true and correct 
copy of the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals is attached as Appendix 1. 
Thereafter, the defendant sought reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, which 
was denied by Order, dated July 19, 1996. A true and correct copy of the Order is 
attached hereto as Appendix 2. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The plaintiff in this case is the assignee of Jus 4 Fun Rental. Complaint, ^ 
3, R. 1. The complaint in this action was filed on June 15, 1993. R. 1-3. Defendant filed 
his answer to the complaint on July 6, 1993. R. 8-13. 
2. On December 2, 1993, plaintiff, through its then counsel, Jeff L. Hollings-
worth, filed a document with the court entitled "Satisfaction of Judgment" (R. 15), which 
resulted in the action being dismissed. 
3. On June 22, 1994, plaintiff, through its then counsel, R. Craig Schneider, 
filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order. R. 99-105. That motion was based upon an 
allegation that the Satisfaction of Judgment was prepared in error by a non-attorney 
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employee and filed with the court by mistake. The motion was brought pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(l)(5) [sic]; however, the motion also referred to Utah 
R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7). R. 101. 
4. On July 11, 1994, defendant, through counsel, filed an objection to the 
motion and, alternatively, requested that the court enter an order compelling the plaintiff 
to provide supplemental responses to the defendant's previously filed discovery requests. 
R. 115-195. That objection and motion was supported by a memorandum of points and 
authorities. R. 196 - 209. 
5. A hearing was held on September 7, 1994, at which the court heard 
arguments relative to the plaintiffs motion to set aside the dismissal and the defendant's 
alternative motion to compel discovery. R. 362 - 379 (transcript of proceedings). 
Without designating the basis for its ruling, the court granted the motion to set aside the 
dismissal at that hearing. R. 377. 
6. At that same hearing, the court declined to compel the plaintiff to respond 
to certain discovery requests propounded by defendant on the basis of relevancy (R. 370 -
371) and privilege (R. 375 - 376). 
7. A trial on the merits was held on February 2, 1995. R. 380 - 518 (transcript 
of proceedings). At the trial, the plaintiff presented evidence and testimony concerning 
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the alleged damage to the rented jet skis, for the repair of which the owner, Jus 4 Fun 
Rental, claimed a right to compensation from defendant. 
8. At the trial, the defendant presented the testimony of an expert witness, Ron 
Sprouse, who testified that the damage shown in the photographs submitted into evidence 
by the plaintiff was the result of reasonable wear and tear, as that term is used in the jet 
ski rental industry. R. 478 - 501. No evidence was presented by the plaintiff concerning 
whether the damage was the result of reasonable wear and tear. 
9. On April 6, 1995, the court entered its written decision (R. 335 - 336), 
finding for the plaintiff and against the defendant, and directing counsel for the plaintiff 
to prepare the necessary documents to give effect to the court's judgment. 
10. The court executed and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order and Judgment on May 18, 1995. R. 337 - 344. 
11. Defendant's notice of appeal was timely filed on May 24, 1995. R. 345-346. 
12. On appeal, defendant raised the following issues: 
a. Did the trial court err when it granted plaintiffs motion for relief from 
the dismissal under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)? 
i. Was the trial court without jurisdiction to set aside the 
dismissal because the motion to set aside was untimely under Utah R.Civ.P. 
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60(b)(1)? 
ii. Did the trial court err if it is found that it set aside the 
dismissal under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5)? 
iii. Did the trial court err if it is found that it set aside the 
dismissal under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7)? 
b. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs motion 
to set aside the dismissal? 
c. Did the trial court err when it refused to allow discovery essential to 
defendant's defenses? 
d. Did the trial court err in awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff 
without adequate findings? 
e. Are the trial court's findings supported by substantial evidence? 
f. Did the trial court err by failing to find that the "damage" exceeded 
"reasonable wear and tear", as allowed under the terms of the rental contract? 
13. The Court of Appeals disposed of the issues identified above in subpara-
graphs a. (including its three subparts) and b. by noting that there was no order in the 
record on appeal and determining that the "assumed dismissal appears only to have 
remedied a nonexistant [sic] order." See Appendix 1. 
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14. Regarding the remaining issues identified above in subparagraphs a, d., e., 
and f, the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals stated only that the court had 
"reviewed these claims and [found] them to be without merit." Id. 
15. Defendant sought reconsideration on the following grounds: 
a. The absence of the order from the record was not fatal to defendant's 
appeal because the plaintiff admitted the existence of the dismissal order. In fact, 
it was plaintiff who moved for relief from the order of dismissal. 
b. The decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it relates to the 
uncontroverted expert testimony of defendant's witness is contrary to the decision 
of the Court of Appeals in Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 898 P.2d 1230, 265 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
16. By order dated July 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied defendant's 
motion for reconsideration. See Appendix 2. 
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED 
The provisions of Utah R. App. P. 46 gives guidance concerning the circumstances 
in which this Court will consider granting a petition for certiorari. Included in that 
recitation are the following: 
a. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
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conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue 
of law; 
b. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state 
or federal law in a way which is in conflict with a decision of this Court; and/or 
c. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise 
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the decision of the Court of Appeals should 
be reviewed by this Court because each of the above criteria are met. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals conflicts with a prior decision of that court. The decision sanctions the 
trial court's departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. The 
decision departs from decisions of this Court in that it creates a privilege where none 
previously existed and impermissibly restricts the defendant's right to obtain discovery. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
RELATIVE TO DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
ARGUMENT CONTRADICTS ITS PRIOR 
RULING IN GLEZOS v. FRONTIER INVESTMENTS 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of Appeals stated that it had considered 
the arguments of defendant relative to the discovery and expert witness arguments and 
determined them to be without merit. Even though specifically presented to the court in 
defendant's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals refused to consider its own 
precedent, which was decided last year. 
On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court erred in disregarding the only 
evidence presented on the issue of what constitutes "reasonable wear and tear" as that 
term applies to the use of rental jet skis. Defendant could only owe money if the alleged 
damage to the jet skis exceeded "reasonable wear and tear." In its brief, plaintiff argued 
that defendant assigned error to the trial court for failing to define the term "reasonable 
wear and tear" and asserted that no definition of the term exists in case law. Brief of 
Appellee, page 26. That characterization misses the thrust of defendant's argument. 
Defendant argued that, in order to determine the measure of damages, the trial 
court was obligated to determine what, if any, damage to the jet skis exceeded the 
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"reasonable wear and tear" allowed in the contract. To support his position, defendant 
introduced expert testimony on that issue. Defendant's expert testified that nothing in 
the condition of the jet skis exceeded "reasonable wear and tear," as that term is used in 
the jet ski rental industry. That testimony was uncontroverted. 
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the argument had no merit, at least in 
regard to the expert witness argument, overlooks that court's recent decision in Glezos 
v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995). That case involved the 
interpretation of a liquidated damages provision in a contract for purchase of property. 
In Glezos, this court held that the trial court improperly ignored uncontroverted expert 
testimony regrading the fair market value of the property at forfeiture. In the instant case, 
the trial court improperly ignored the uncontroverted expert testimony relative to the 
definition of the term "wear and tear" and, consistent with the ruling in Glezos, the trial 
court should have been reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT 
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ADMISSIONS 
OF PLAINTIFF AS SUPPLEMENTING THE RECORD 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of Appeals stated that it did not consider 
appellant's procedural arguments on the basis that no order of dismissal was found in the 
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record on appeal and the order of dismissal appeared "only to have remedied a 
nonexistant [sic] order." In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon State v. 
Theison, 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that "appellant has the burden 
when raising objections on appeal to see that the record contains the materials necessary 
to support his appeal." 
The court's conclusion implicitly determined that appellant's procedural argument 
was not considered because no order of dismissal was found in the record on appeal, even 
though defendant designated the entire record on appeal. The court refused to consider 
defendant's procedural arguments because it was unable to locate the order of dismissal 
in the record on appeal. The court's refusal to consider defendant's procedural arguments 
ignores the fact that the order of dismissal, itself, is not necessary to resolution of the 
procedural errors assigned by defendant. 
Other courts have determined that an admission by a party in an appellate brief are 
sufficient to supplement the record on appeal. The court in Reeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745 
(Okl. 1989), discussed the issue in the context of a lien foreclosure action: 
. . . Because the judgment roll in the earlier has not been 
included in the appellate record tendered for our review in this 
appeal, there is here absolutely 110 record from the prior case 
for our consideration. [Footnote omitted.] The parties un-
equivocally admit in their briefs that the trial court ruled on 
May 1, 1978 [footnote omitted] for the Supplier on the latter's 
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claim for money, while the Hen phase of the dispute, later 
resolved in Reeves' favor, was decided on August 31, 1978. 
[Footnote omitted.] Were it not for these critical admissions 
in the parties' briefs> failure to incorporate the judgment 
roll from the earlier suit would have been fatal to Reeves' 
appeal. [Footnote omitted.] Without the admitted facts, we 
would be compelled to affirm because the record would be 
insufficient to pass on the dispositive prevailing-party-status 
and the bar-of-limitation issues. . . . Inasmuch as the critical 
extra-record facts, which stand admitted in the parties' briefs, 
may be regarded as supplementing the incomplete appellate 
record [footnote omitted] and are ample to supple the defi-
ciency, the errors Reeves urge for reversal can undergo 
appellate scrutiny. 
Id. at 753-754 (emphasis supplied).See, also, Deffenbaugh v. Hudson, 791 P.2d 84, 86 
n.3 (Okl. 1990); Womack v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 726 P.2d 1178, 1181 n. 8 (Okl. 
1986). 
The following statements are contained in the Brief of Appellee filed in this matter 
on or about February 29, 1996: 
. . . The court, by mistake and unaware that a hearing on the 
merits was not had, dismissed the case. 
Brief of Appellee, page 6 (Court of Proceedings). 
2. On December 2, 1993, Plaintiff filed a document with 
the court entitled "Satisfaction of Judgment", R. 15., which 
resulted in the action being dismissed. 
Brief of Appellee, page 7 (Statement of Facts). 
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3. On June 22,1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the 
Dismissal. R. 99-105. That motion was based upon the fact 
that the Satisfaction of Judgment had been filed in error and 
that the court had dismissed the case in error. 
Id. 
. . . As has been detailed supra [sic], Plaintiff had inadver-
tently signed and filed a Satisfaction of Judgment which 
resulted in the court dismissing the claim. 
Brief of Appellee, page 13. 
In addition to the foregoing references, the plaintiff admitted the existence of an 
order of dismissal in numerous other places throughout its brief. It is clear, then, that 
plaintiff acknowledged an order of dismissal was entered which resulted in the case being 
dismissed. Plaintiff further acknowledged that it filed a motion to set aside the dismissal. 
It is from the order granting the motion to set aside the dismissal that defendant appealed. 
It is admitted by all parties that the case was dismissed, yet the court refused to rule on 
the procedural arguments because of the absence from the record of an order of dismissal. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO REVERSE BASED ON 
DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY ARGUMENTS CONTRADICTS 
EXISTING STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Implicit in the Court of Appeals' Memorandum Decision is the determination that 
plaintiffs claim of privilege with respect to discovery materials was justified. Defendant 
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submitted interrogatories and document requests to plaintiff seeking, among other things, 
evidence of an attorney's fees agreement by which plaintiff claimed its attorney's fees 
damages, evidence of actual repairs done to the jet skis, evidence of the actual cause of 
damage to the jet ski and evidence relating to defendant's theory that Just 4 Fun Rental, 
Inc.'s claim against defendant was nothing but the furtherance of a fraud scheme. 
The instructions to defendant's interrogatories (R. 119-123) expressly require that, 
where attorney-client privilege is claimed, the full and complete foundation for the claim 
of privilege be set forth in lieu of another response. Plaintiff failed to provide any such 
information, but nevertheless refused to answer on the basis of privilege2. 
Without foundational information, plaintiff could not, and did not, sustain its 
burden to establish that the information it sought to withhold was in fact governed by the 
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources 
Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990)("the mere existence of an attorney-client 
relationship 'does not ipso facto make all communications between them confidential' 
. . . each case must be considered individually to determine whether the communication 
can be properly considered confidential"). That the Court of Appeals sanctioned the trial 
2
 See, e.g., Answer to Interrogatory No. 27 (asking for the identity of documents 
transmitted to Just 4 Fun Rental, Inc. by plaintiffs counsel): "Plaintiff objects to 
interrogatory no. 27 on the grounds that it calls for information protected by the attorney-
client privilege and protected as attorney-work product." 
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court on this issue mandates review by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Plaintiff received an absolute assignment of Jus 4 Fun Rental's claim against 
defendant. That assignment was admitted into evidence as Exhibit P-2. Jus 4 Fun Rental, 
Inc., the assignor, did not hire a lawyer to act on its behalf. Therefore, there were no 
communications between Just 4 Fun Rental, Inc. and a lawyer representing Jus 4 Fun 
Rental, Inc. which could be privileged. Notwithstanding the clear factual situation, 
however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, sanctioning a nonexistent 
privilege. Plaintiff hired an attorney to pursue its assigned claim. Confidential 
communications between plaintiff and its attorney are protected by Utah R. Evid. 504(b). 
The trial court ruled that the assignor and assignee were one and the same for attorney-
client privilege purposes and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. 
There is no support for that proposition. Indeed, Utah R. Evid. 504(c) states: 
The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's 
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a 
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar represen-
tative of a corporation, association, or other organization, 
whether or no in existence. The person who was the lawyer 
at the time of the communication is presumed to have author-
ity to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
Utah R. Evid. 504(c). There seem to be no Utah cases interpreting that rule. However, 
it seems clear that a client may have communications with a lawyer which would be 
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protectable, and that the client's successor, then, has the right to assert the privilege as to 
the prior communications between the client and the lawyer. 
Nothing in Rule 504(c) on its face, however, would suggest that the lawyer of an 
assignee of a single asset, after the assignment, may converse with the assignor, who is 
not the client of the lawyer, and have a privilege as to that communication under Rule 
504. The assignor is neither a client of the lawyer nor a representative of the client of the 
lawyer. 
While the lawyer's notes of those communications, as notes of a meeting with any 
prospective witness would be protected by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), correspondence 
between the attorney and his non-client is not protected under that rule. 
Further, the language of Utah R. Evid. 504 itself connotes a successorship of an 
entire entity, individual or corporate, rather than a successor to a single asset. As has 
been recognized in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, v.McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662 (D. Kan. 
1988): 
. . . [T]he transfer of assets from one entity to another does 
not generally transfer the attorney-client privilege. 
Id. at 664 (also noting that an attorney-client relationship is personal). 
Affirming the trial court's ruling on interrogatory no. 24 is even more egregious, 
however. Interrogatory no. 24 requested communications between the plaintiff and Jus 
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4 Fun Rental, Inc. The plaintiff had objected "on the grounds that is overly broad, unduly 
burdensome and calls for the production of information which is not relevant to the 
subject matter of this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence." R.60. It could not be more clear that conversations and 
communications between plaintiff, the assignee, and Jus 4 Fun Rentals, Inc., the assignor, 
might contain valuable admissions. But the trial court did not even rule on the objections 
raised. Instead, the trial court held that defendant was not entitled to the information 
sought because: "The Court: . . . I think it's a privilege." R.376. No privilege had even 
been asserted by plaintiff on that interrogatory, but the court blocked discovery 
improperly with sua sponte creation of a privilege. The court's rulings on privilege 
prevented the defendant from having access to what is often the most valuable evidence, 
admissions, and is both erroneous and prejudicial. Without any explanation, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed this ruling, finding defendant's arguments without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals (1) conflicts with its own precedent-
setting case, (2) sanctions extreme departure from accepted judicial proceedings; and (3) 
lets stand privilege and discovery issues in conflict with the clear language of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court should grant 
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certiorari to review the Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Vv^day of August, 1996. 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant j 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, this )Qt^ dav of August, 1996, 
to the following: 
Andrea M. Hidvegi 
Attorney at Law 
5055 South State Str< 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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Action Collection Service, 
Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
Van Adams, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
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F I L E D 
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Third Circuit, Murray Department 
The Honorable Michael K. Burton 
Attorneys: David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Andrea M. Hidvegi, Murray, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Van Adams challenges the trial court's entry of judgment 
against him and in favor of Action Collection Services, Inc. 
(Action). We affirm. 
Adams's appeal first focuses on a procedural irregularity. 
Adams claims the trial court initially erred in granting Action's 
Motion to Vacate Dismissal Order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b) (1) because it was untimely. However, we have scoured the 
record and cannot find an order of dismissal. The proceeding 
vacating the assumed dismissal appears only to have remedied a 
nonexistant order. Accordingly, we need not address Adams's 
procedural argument regarding Rule 60(b). Cf. State v. Theison, 
709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (stating " [alppellant 
has the burden when raising objections on appeal to see that the 
record contains the materials necessary to support his appeal"). 
Turning to the merits of the trial court's ultimate judgment 
against him, Adams claims (1) that the trial court's refusal to 
allow certain requested discovery prejudiced his defense and (2) 
that unresolved material facts left the court's findings both 
insufficient and unsupported by substantial evidence. We have 
reviewed these claims and find them to be without merit. We thus 
decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-
89 (Utah 1989) (stating courts need not address meritless claims 
on appeal). 
Affirmed. 
5%3>3P<^ 
NOTrman H. Jack^n, Judge 
/<^&&*'C (w* &l£fi&&^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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Action Collection Services, 
Inc. , 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Van Adams, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Case No. 950386-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition 
for rehearing, filed July 1, 1996. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
i < * Dated this I* day of July, 1996 
FOR THE COURT: 
/WfluiU N\. &* % C \ 
Marilyn M;. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on July 19, 1996, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
David W. Scofield, Esq. 
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters 
Attorneys at Law for Appellant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Andrea M. Hidvegi, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellee 
5055 South State Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
Third Circuit Court 
Attn: Appeals Clerk 
5022 South State 
Murray, UT 84107 
Dated this July 19, 1996. 
Robin Hutcheson 
Deputy Clerk 
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TITLE VII. 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The 
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme 
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry recommending that 
the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a recom-
mendation by motion or otherwise. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- The 1994 amendment added the Subdivision 
ment, effective October 1, 1992, changed the (a) designation, redesignating former Subdivi-
subdivision designations from numbers to let- sions (a) to (d) as (a)(1) to (4), and added Subdi-
ters. vision (b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 
(Utah 1992). 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint 
and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties. 
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested 
jointly, severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of 
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition separately; or any two or 
more of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be 
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it 
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the 
cases. A cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other 
filing. 
(b) Parties, All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be 
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of 
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of 
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party 
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noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with 
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition, 
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intend-
ing to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time 
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an 
order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court 
certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to the 
Supreme Court. Motions to certify the record prior to action on the petition by 
the Supreme Court should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to 
the Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in oppo-
sition and such understanding cannot be derived from the contents of the 
petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix. If a motion is 
appropriate, it shall be made to the Supreme Court after the filing of a peti-
tion but prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case of a 
stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion may be 
made before the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court or any party to the case may request that additional parts of the record 
be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- divisions accordingly; added the last sentence 
ment, effective October 1,1992, deleted former in Subdivision (a); and deleted two sentences 
Subdivision (a), relating to appearance, docket- from the end of Subdivision (c) requiring copies 
ing fee, filing, and service, and former Subdivi- of motions for certification and transmission to 
sion (c), providing for the respondent's cross- be sent to the parties and making motions and 
petition, and redesignated the remaining sub- orders subject to Rule 23. 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the 
final decision by the Court of Appeals. The docket fee shall be paid at the time 
of filing the petition. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is beyond the time indicated in paragraph (a) of this 
rule or which is not accompanied by the docket fee. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of 
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If a petition for 
rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the petition for a 
writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of rehearing or 
of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing. 
(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this 
rule; or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of 
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certio-
rari of another party to the case is granted. 
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the cross-petition. 
The clerk shall refuse any cross-petition not accompanied by the docket 
fee. 
(4) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any 
other filing. The clerk of the court shall refuse any filing so joined. 
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after 
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, 
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plaintiff never moved for a substitution of par-
ties nor asked for an enlargement of the 90-day 
period within which to seek substitution, it 
was not error for the trial court to dismiss the 
complaint. Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1976). 
Transfer of interest 
—Conveyance by defendant 
In quiet title action court did not lose juris-
diction when defendant conveyed during pen-
dency of action; Subdivision (c) continues liti-
gation with same litigants to determinative 
conclusion, to avoid stalemate by conveyance 
pendente lite, resulting in series of endless 
suits. Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 
538 (1953). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 
§§ 225 et seq., 231 to 233. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 58 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Enforceability of warrant of attor-
ney to confess judgment against assignee, 
guarantor, or other party obligating himself 
for performance of primary contract, 5 
A.L.R.3d 426. 
Divorce or annulment of marriage, power of 
incompetent spouse's guardian, committee, or 
next Mend to sue for granting or vacation of, 
or to make a compromise or settlement in such 
suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681. 
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit 
against debt of depositor not due at time of his 
death, 7 A.L.R.3d 908. 
Validity and effect of agreement that debt or 
legal obligation contemporaneously or subse-
quently incurred shall be canceled by death of 
creditor or obligee, 11 A.L.R3d 1427. 
Applicability, as affected by change in par-
ties, of statute permitting commencement of 
new action within specified time after failure 
of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848. 
Cause of death, official death certificate as 
evidence of in civil or criminal action, 21 
A.L.R.3d 418. 
Attorney's death prior to final abjudication 
or settlement of case as affecting compensation 
under contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d 
1375. 
Validity, in contract for installment sale of 
consumer goods, or commercial paper given in 
connection therewith, of provision waiving, as 
against assignee, defenses good against seller, 
39 A.L.R.3d 518. 
Conservator or guardian for an incompetent, 
priority and preference in appointment of, 65 
A.L.R.3d 991. 
Defamation action as surviving plaintiffs 
death, under statute not specifically covering 
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272. 
Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party, 
filed under Rule 25(a)(1) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of 
party after death, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 816. 
Key Numbers. — Parties ** 59. 
PART V. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
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(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(2) Insurance agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the exis-
tence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person 
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reim-
burse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning 
the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in 
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insur-
ance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement. 
(3) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivi-
sion (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a show-
ing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials 
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has 
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concern-
ing the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon 
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by 
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court 
order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a 
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, me-
chanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is 
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person mak-
ing it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(4) Trial preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opin-
ions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Sub-
division (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: 
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other 
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to 
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance 
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify 
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by 
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such 
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an ex-
pert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not ex-
pected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) 
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
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impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect 
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a re-
quest for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, 
except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
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though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action, 
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a 
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by 
the attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has 
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on 
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are 
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters 
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after 
service of the motion. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tenta-
tively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and 
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determin-
ing such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary 
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered 
or amended whenever justice so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference 
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery 
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state 
his address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) 
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection 
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to 
it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica-
tion, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a rea-
sonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an 
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person 
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within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and 
limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided 
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in *rhich the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further 
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the 
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court 
in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 26, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, § 78-21-3; U.R.C.P. 43(a). 
Continuance to permit discovery, U.R.C.P. 
56(f). 
Depositions upon oral examination, U.R.C.P. 
30(c). 
Depositions, use in court proceedings, 
U.R.C.P. 32. 
Depositions, when taken, UJtCP. 30(a). 
Discovery procedures, Rule 4-502, Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
Exclusion of deposition from evidence, 
U.R.C.P. 32(b). 
ANALY8IS 
Applicability of rule. 
Appellate review. 
—Denial of discovery request. 
Privilege against self-mcrimination. 
Protective order. 
—Trade secrets. 
—Waiver. 
Purpose of rule. 
Scope of discovery. 
—In general. 
Relevance. 
—Insurance agreements. 
—Official information privilege. 
—Trial preparation. 
Adjuster's file. 
Discovery from state. 
Eminent domain. 
Otherwise discoverable records. 
Subjective matters. 
Testimony of witness. 
Cited. 
Applicability of rule. 
The taking of depositions pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in 
an action to remove a public official from office 
for malfeasance pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 
6. State v. Geurta, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 
(1961). 
Appellate review. 
—Denial of discovery request 
When denial of a discovery request is deter-
mined on review to have been in error, the bur-
den of demonstrating that the erroneous denial 
was not prejudicial is upon the party resisting 
discovery. Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert granted, 892 P.2d 
13 (Utah 1995). 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Privilege against self-mcrimination may be 
Expert and other opinion testimony, U.R.E 
701 to 706. 
Fee for filing notice rf deposition concerning 
action in another stats, § 21-1-5. 
Liability insurance, admissibility of, U.R.E 
411. 
Motions, evidence on, by depositions, 
U.R.C.P. 43(b). 
Privileges, §§ 78-24-8, 78-24-9; U.R.E 501 et 
seq. 
Summary judgment, discovery supporting or 
opposing motion for, U.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Terminate or limit examination, motion to, 
U.R.C.P. 30(d). 
asserted in civil discovery proceedings to re-
fuse to answer interrogatories, questions posed 
in depositions, demands for production of docu-
ments, and requests for admissions; however, 
to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party 
must show that the response sought to be com-
pelled might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 
(Utah 1984). 
Protective order. 
—Trade secrets. 
Materials that are the subject of a protective 
order under Subdivision (c)(7) are not automat-
ically privileged for purposes of Exemption 4 of 
the federal Freedom of Information Act be-
cause the determination of whether documents 
contain trade secrets under Exemption 4 is to 
be made solely by applying the express exemp-
tion for trade secrets and confidential commer-
cial or financial information found in the ex-
emption itself. Anderson v. Department of 
Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th 
Cir. 1990). 
—Waiver. 
Inaction and delay in filing a motion for pro-
tection with respect to documents alleged to be 
work product waives whatever right a defen-
dant may have been able to assert. Moreover, a 
defendant's failure to demonstrate any dili-
gence whatsoever in asserting the privilege is 
itself a waiver. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164 
(Utah 1990). 
Purpose of rule. 
The purposes of discovery rules are to make 
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by 
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities, 
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery 
so that the parties and the court can determine 
the facts and resolve the issues as directly, 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating civil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 AX.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
 appeal, 38 A.L.IUth 1170. 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
 J u r y trial w a i v e r aa binding on later state 
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
 c i v i l ^ ^ 4 8 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits Q ^
 r e p o r t e r > 8 d e a t h o r disability prior to 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil ^ 3 , ^ ^
 n o t e 8 ^ ^ ^ ^ f o r reversal or 
case, 7 AL.R.3d 1000.
 n e w ^ 5 ? A L R 4 t h 1 0 4 9 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.LR.3d 335. Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc
 n e w ^ Q n d o f ^ 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in
 r , ° , ° - A T « c , , 
which they are written, 10 A L.R3d 501. * £ * ° f damages - modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by „ , . 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
 J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference m a n i n actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
A.L.R.3d 1101. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 189. 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq., 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 HO, 116. 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
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on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with 
the lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the 
course of representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and 
the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative 
incidental to the professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, 
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of com-
mon interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's repre-
sentatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in 
any combination. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
client, the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a 
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corpo-
ration, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The 
person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to 
have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were 
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit 
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or 
fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communica-
tion relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same 
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intes-
tate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication rele-
vant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the 
client to the lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to 
an issue concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting wit-
ness; or 
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of com-
mon interest between two or more clients if the communication was made 
by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered 
in an action between any of the clients. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 504 is 
based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United 
States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would replace 
and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) 
and is intended to be consistent with the ethi-
cal obligations of confidentiality set forth in 
Rule 1 6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Con-
duct 
The Committee revised the proposed rule of 
the United States Supreme Court to address 
the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S Ct. 677 (1981), as 
to when communications involving representa-
tives of a corporation are protected by the priv-
ilege. The Committee rejected limiting the 
privilege to members of the "control group" 
and added as subparagraph (a)(4) a definition 
for "representative of the client" that includes 
within the privilege disclosures not only of the 
client and the client's formal spokesperson, but 
also employees who are specifically authorized 
to communicate to the lawyer concerning a le-
gal matter. The word "specifically" is intended 
to preclude a general authorization from the 
client for the client's employees to communi-
cate under the cloak of the privilege, but is 
intended to allow the client, as related to a 
specific matter, to authorize the client's em-
ployees as "representatives" to disclose infor-
mation to the lawyer as to that specific matter 
with confidence that the disclosures will re-
main within the lawyer-client privilege. 
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be 
directly paid by the lawyer as long as the rep-
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(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
person who made the confidential communication, by the person's guardian or 
conservator, or by the person's personal representative if the person is de-
ceased. The person who was the cleric at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the communi-
cant. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The consid-
erations that support evidentiary privileges for 
confidential communications generally favor a 
privilege for confidential communications 
made to a member of the clergy, at least to the 
extent that the communication is entrusted to 
the cleric in the cleric's religious capacity. See 
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2396 at 878. See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(3). 
The Committee chose the form of the pro-
posed Rule 506 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (never adopted) for clarity and for consis-
tency with the Committee's proposed Rule 502. 
See, e.g., 51 F.R.D. 315, 371-73. The Commit-
tee began with the basic concept of the current 
rule stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(3), 
making changes as discussed below. 
(a) Definitions. Subparagraph (1) defines 
the term "cleric" to include a Minister, priest, 
rabbit or other similar functionary of a reli-
gious organization." The non-denominational 
and gender neutral term "cleric" replaces the 
terms "priest" and "clergyman" traditionally 
used in statements of the privilege, but em-
braces the same concept. Subparagraph (1) ex-
pands the scope of the concept, however, by in-
cluding as a cleric "an individual reasonably 
believed so to be by the person consulting that 
individual." 
Subparagraph (2) defines a confidential com-
munication consistently with proposed Rule 
502. 
(b) General rule of privilege. The scope of 
the proposed privilege falls between a privilege 
narrowly restricted to doctrinally required con-
fessions and a privilege broadly applicable to 
all confidential communications with a cleric. 
The privilege includes confessions, but also ap-
plies to all confidential communications to the 
cleric that are (1) "in the cleric's religious ca-
pacity" and (2) "necessary and proper for the 
clerics office according to the usual course of 
practice or discipline." The privilege does not 
extend to confidential communications with a 
cleric when the cleric is acting in any capacity 
other than the religious capacity. 
The term "in the cleric's religious capacity" 
was chosen over "in the cleric's professional 
character" to avoid an implication that only 
communications with professional members of 
the clergy are protected. The privilege applies 
to confidential communications with lay clerics 
as well. 
The language "necessary and proper for the 
cleric to discharge the functions of the cleric's 
office according to the usual course of practice 
or discipline" replaces "in the course of disci-
pline enjoined by the church to which he be-
longs" in order to extend the privilege beyond 
doctrinally required confessions. For similar 
language, see Iowa Code Ann. 1950 Section 
622.10. See also, State v. Burkett, 357 N.W.2d 
632 (Iowa 1984) for an application of the Iowa 
statute. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The per-
son who makes the confidential communica-
tion holds the privilege, but the rule provides 
that others may claim the privilege for that 
person in certain circumstances. A cleric is pre-
sumed to have authority to claim the privilege 
for the communicant, though the presumption 
may be overcome by a preponderance of evi-
dence to the contrary. See Rule of Evidence 301 
(a). 
Under the privilege as phrased, the person 
making the confidential communication is en-
titled not only to refuse to disclose the commu-
nication, but also to prevent the disclosure by 
the cleric or others who, by presence in further-
ance of the religious purpose or by overhearing 
without the knowledge of the person making 
the communication, may know the content of 
the communication. Problems of waiver are 
dealt with by Rule 507. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the 
privilege should be specifically enumerated, 
and further endorsed the concept that in the 
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state 
that no privilege existed, rather than express-
ing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the 
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any 
possible clashes with the common law concepts 
of "waiver." 
Rule 504. Lawyer-client. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, 
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who 
is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a 
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A 'lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the 
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the law-
yer in a rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, 
